Incompetency at the time of trial is dealt with 3 by statute in Indiana, as it is most other states.
These statutes usually provide that a person determined to be incompetent to stand trial shall be committed to a state hospital until he has recovered sufficiently to stand trial. The superintendent of the institution decides when the accused has attained the requisite degree of competency to stand trial. 4 It is required under the Indiana statute that a defendant be committed whenever he is found to be incompetent. The state need only prove that the defendant is unable to stand trial. This may be signifi-cantly different from proving that the defendant is "mentally ill" in the civil sense. 5 Briefly, this difference between civil commitment and commitments before trial, arises from the fact that much more evidence of mental incapacity is required where a civil commitment is sought. Whereas, the incompetent defendant need only be proven deficient in "comprehension sufficient to understand the proceedings and make his defense." 6 Additionally, the Indiana commitment-beforetrial statute (Ind. Ann. Stat. §9-1706a) specifies no date of the cornmrancement oi the criminal proceedings against him more certain than "when the defendant shall become sane."
Theon Jackson stood accused cf the robbery of a total of $9.00 from two women. He was a mentally defective deaf mute with the mental age of a pre-school child. He could neither read nor write, nor could he communicate except for the limited use of sign language.
In May of 1968, Jackson came before the Criminal Court of Marion County (Indiana) charged with these robberies.
The trial judge scheduled a hearing to determine if Jackson was competent to stand trial pursuant to the Indiana Law (Ind. Ann. Stat. §9-1706a).
At the hearing two appointed psychiatrists and a teacher from the state school for the deaf testified that they had all interviewed Jackson, and that they agreed that he was Further, Greenwood's commitment was sustained only upon the finding of dangerousness.
In addition, the court commented at some length regarding the disparity of commitment procedures in the states, and the fact that many criminal defendants who are committed never stand trial. The court also pointed out that it is inequitable for the civilly committed to be released earlier than those committed solely because
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of their incapacity to stand trial. Thus, the court held that when a defendant accused of a criminal offense is committed solely due to his mental incapacity, the commitment can be for a reasonable time only, and then, only to determine the probability "that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future." 1 9 Ideally, the Anglo-American system will not permit the trial of a person who cannot defend himself. This principle is at the very center of our legal system. Nevertheless, the difficulty here is that administration of the commitment procedures varies markedly, depending upon the interpreter's view of the substantive criminal law as well as his views on criminal responsibility and mental rehabilitation.20 Committing a defendant, and then subjecting him to a "wait-and-see" approach has clearly failed, as Jackson is witness. "Wait-and-see" has resulted in an abuse of discretion and inadequate assurance of trial.
Indiana places the initiative in determining whether a patient has achieved the requisite mental capacity in the hands of the superintendent of the hospital, who is to certify this fact to the court. 2 1 The Jackson decision in a marked way reflects the growing recognition and concern for the rights of the mentally ill and mentally retarded among some signi-22 ficant elements of our society.
In 1961, it was estimated that there were 720,000 involuntarily commit-23 ted mental patients in this country.
Recent estimates have placed the figure at approximately the same level. 2 4 The recognition given the mentally incapacitated by the Supreme Court, and the numbers there involved, would seem to indicate that there is a further need to deal with the problem legislatively.
There exists the necessity to develop and to redefine standards and procedures for correctly handling the over-all problem of competency for trial. The courts are uncertain as to the specific criteria that need be met to determine whether a defendant is, in fact, incompetent to stand trial. The uncertainty stems from the confusion within the present laws and lack of any pertinent provisions within the states' codes. 2 5 The result is: either the indeterminate con- 
